Abstract-Ubiquitous computing in being actively researched and one of the main technology in ubiquitous computing environments is recognized as RFID system. The RFID system has much benefits but simultaneously has some problems such as user's privacy violation. In this paper, in order to improve the survivability of its nodes, it should build available simulation surrounding sensor nodes. Also, In the proposed cryptosystems we use a new hash function for user authentication and a stream cipher based on LFSR(Linear Feedback Shift Register) for message encryption and decryption. Moreover, each algorithm is programmed with C language and simulated on IBM-PC system and we analyze the randomness properties of the proposed algorithms by using statistical tests.
location privacy but is not scalable for a huge number of tags since many hash-operations must be performed at the back-end and it additionally relies on the implementation of a random number generator in the tags to randomize tag responses. Such devices need sources for physical randomness so that the implementation is rather complex and expensive [3] , [4] .
II. THE HASH-LOCK APPROACH
The Hash-Lock approach proposed by Weis et al. [5] . uses the concept of locking and unlocking the tag to allow access. The security of the Hash-Lock approach uses the principle based on the difficulty of inverting a one-way hash function. The scheme makes use of a back-end database to provide correct reader to tag identification and the concept of meta-ID stored in each tag. To lock the tag the reader sends a hash of a random key, as the meta-ID, to the tag. i.e. meta-ID<-hash(key). The reader then stores the meta-ID and key in the back end database. While locked, the tag only responds with the meta-ID when queried. As shown in Fig. 1 , to unlock the tag, the reader will query the tag for the meta-ID. The reader will then use the meta-ID to lookup a key and ID for the tag in the database. If the meta-ID is found, the reader then sends the key to the tag in an attempt to unlock the tag. The tag hashes the key and compares the results against the meta-ID stored in the tag. 
A. Hash Function Algorithm
The Cryptographic hash functions are playing very important roles in modern cryptology such as checking the integrity of information or increasing efficiency of authentication code and digital signature. While compared with general hash functions used in non cryptographic computer applications, although both cases are functions from domain to range, they're different from each other in several important aspects. Also, the hash function outputs the value called has value or has code of fixed length by the input of messages having random length. In more strict words, the hash function h corresponds text alignment of random length as n bit text alignment having fixed length.
When 
is a many-to-one corresponding function. Accordingly, the collision exists for the has function in general. For example, assuming function h as the one having input value of t bit and output value of n bit, the number of input values while h has randomness corresponds to each output value. Accordingly, two input values selected at random with probability 2 n  gets to have same output value regardless of the t value.
The handling process of most has functions is the repetitive one hashing the input of random length by divided processing of successive fixed blocks. First, the input X becomes padded to become a multiple of block length and divided from X 1 to t number of blocks as X t . The hash function h is described as follows.
Here, f is the compress function), H i is the chaining variable between 1  i and i , while IV is the initial value. The general structure of repetitive has function using compressed function is like the Fig. 2 . The calculation of hash value is dependent on the chain variable. While starting the hash calculation, this chain variable gets to have the fixed initial value expressed as the part of algorithm. The compressed function renews this chain variable by getting the message block as input until it becomes hashed. The processes get repeated in cycles for all message blocks and the last value gets output as hash value on the same message [2] . The hash function gets classified into 3 types depending on which structure is used as internal compressed function.
1) Hash-Functions based Block Cipher 2) Hash-Functions based Modular Calculation 3) The other Hash-Functions
The exclusive hash function has fast processing speed and they're the functions specially designed for hashing regardless of other system sub factors. The exclusive has function proposed until now has the structure based on MD4 [6] designed by Rivest in 1990. There are MD5 [3] , SHA-1 [7] , RIPEMD-160 [8] and HAVAL [9] for hash functions of MD series being widely used at this time.
When a specific hash function is assigned, although it is ideal to verify the lowest limit on complications attacking the hash function for the establishment of safe hash functions, such method isn't known for the most part in reality and the applicable known complication of the attack becomes considered as the security of hash function for the most part. If hash value is assumed as uniform probability variable. The following are well-known facts.
 For the n bit hash function h , the guessing attack to discover preimage and second preimage with n 2 operation.
 For the attacker that is able to select messages, the birthday attack is able to discover the collision message pair M , M  with about 2 / 2 n operation. If n bit hash function satisfies the following two characteristics, it gets to have an ideal security. Once the hash value is given, the discovery of preimage and second preimage require n 2 operation.
B. Suggestion of Algorithm
The exclusive hash function proposed in this thesis has been designed at 32 bit process using addition, subtraction, multiplication and exclusive logical sum operations that are basic operations of the CPU. Although Boolean function has been used in order to raise nonlinearity in case of MD series exclusive hash functions, the round (a, b, c, d, e, f, x6, mul);  round (f, b, d, a, c, e, x7, mul) ;
Here, construct a round (a, b, c, d, e, f, X, mul) is, Gen_32(f, f, f, f) ; e *=mul; Here, the Gen_32( ) function is the one which gets four 32 bit registers as input to use first, second, third and fourth 8 bit as the input of S-box and makes 32 bit value with corresponding S-box output. c) Key_schedule is, x0 -= x7 ^ 0xA5A5A5A5; x1 ^= x0; x2 += x1; x3 -= x2; ^ ((～x1) << 7); x4 ^= x3; x5 += x4; x6 -= x5 ^((～x4) >> 23); x7 ^= x6; x0 += x7; x1 -= x0 ^((～x7) << 7); x2 ^= x1; x3 += x2; x4 -= x3 ^((～x2) >> 23); x5 ^= x4; x6 += x5; x7 ^= x6 ^ 0x01234567;
It is like the following. h which is the halfway hash value of 192bit and becomes the final hash value after termination of algorithm. Accordingly, the 32bit SRES(Signed Response) and the encryption key 64bit c K are finally generated by the following formula.
2) S-box S-box has used the 1 
x operation in order to raise nonlinearity and the operation of getting inverse elements generally require a lot of operation time. But the operation was performed in advance to form a reference table because it is an inverse element at
GF
Because inverse element of 0 doesn't exist, the value of 0 is corresponded. But because this isn't cryptologically safe, the exclusive-OR has been performed for 0xa5 value to form a table having 256 eight bit values. The S-box table is shown on Table I.   TABLE I: S-BOX TABLE   III .
DESIGN OF INDEPENDENT AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL

A. Experimental 1) Simulation environment
In this paper, in order to improve the survivability of its nodes, it should build available simulation surrounding under the surrounding sensor nodes (it mean 4 component; survivability of sensor nodes -available battery, the output of sensor nodes -available area for search, the communication path of sensor nodes -generation of routing table, bandwidth of sensor nodes -the size of data transfer). Visual simulation environment configuration with Fig. 3 .
2) TinyOS As in Fig. 4 is Tiny Operating System such as existent UNIX in 32bits computer-on-a-chip a number Megabyte memory need. Sensor node has memory of 10Kbyte degrees of 8-16bit computer-on-a-chip in sensor network. There are TinyOS, MicroC/OS, Nucleus, Nano-X to available Operating System. TinyOS embedded hardware directly and need one physical address space as one Process. Memory is suitable Operating System to sensor network because memory allocates compile dynamically and use Function Call instead of software signaling or exception processing [9] , [10] . 
IV. CONCLUSION
The work by Sarma et al. [10] predicts that over the next several years, development of low-cost tags in the range of US $0.05 or less will continue to present a challenge to manufacturers. Low-cost tags will remain extremely resource scarce, passively powered, and have limited memory resources comprised of several hundred bytes, as opposed to kilobytes. The range of communications will be a few meters, with a limit on computational power. Using standard cryptographic security mechanisms will exceed the capability of these devices. To meet these challenges, more work must be done to develop new hardware-efficient hash functions within low-cost RFID tags, along with new lightweight cryptographic primitives and protocols. Any new and efficient functions need to take into account the limited resources of low-cost RFID tags.
In this paper the threats to personal privacy and security that exist in low-cost RFID tags have been identified, goals and assumptions defined, and proposed solutions to address these privacy and security risks analyzed. Based on the comparison of these solutions, the selective blocker tag provides the best solution satisfying most requirements.
As RFID technology advances allowing "smarter" tags, the line between RFID devices, smart cards, and general-purpose computers will blur. Today's research benefiting RFID devices will aid in the development of secure ubiquitous computing systems in the future.
